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Abstract
Since the 1990s, an intensive discussion on the necessity and the potential de-
sign of international competition policy has developed. As a preliminary result,
some general tendencies can be observed: Many states (including the U.S. and
the EU) and most antitrust experts hold the opinion that the traditional system
of national competition laws (including their extra-territorial application) is not
sucient for the protection of competition in the new millennium. Therefore,
some kind of international arrangement in regard to competition rules seems to
be necessary. The introduction of substantive international competition rules
with an international competition authority and a corresponding court (in anal-
ogy to the supranational European competition law) is not seen as feasible
and/or desirable. Thus the solution should not be sought in centralised global
competition rules but be based primarily upon national competition laws and
authorities. Consequently, the main thrust of the discussion has shifted from
the idea of a larger harmonisation and convergence of national competition laws
to the problem of better international enforcement of these laws. Although bi-
lateral cooperation between national competition authorities have become an
increasingly important issue, bilateral cooperation agreements are considered
only a rst step to a more preferable multilateral (or plurilateral) solution (e.g.
within the WTO). Generally, the path to international competition rules is seen
as a pragmatic, step-by-step approach, which can achieve its aim only in the
long run. The currently favoured informal network approach, which remains
without commitment and emphasizes primarily the gathering, discussion and
exchange of information between national competition authorities, is in line
with such a pragmatic approach to the incremental evolution of international
competition rules. How can we describe the present situation from a global per-
spective? We have a multitude of national competition laws and enforcement
agencies (competition authorities, courts) with more or less dierent substan-
tive and procedural rules. Dierent competition laws and enforcement agencies
can also exist within a (kind of) federal system, as to some degree within the
U.S. and to a larger extent within the EU, where European competition rules
and national competition laws coexist on two dierent levels. Since the com-
petencies of these competition laws and enforcement agencies overlap, many
external eects and conicts can emerge. Up to now we cannot reasonably ar-
gue that this complex structure of competition laws forms an integrated system
for protecting competition in international markets. The establishment of inter-
national competition rules (as well as the less ambitious international network
approach), which on one side should help to solve the problems of the current
situation, can, on the other side, increase the complexity of the system, because
an additional vertical regulatory level in regard to competition rules would be
introduced { including new potential conicts of competencies. But what arethe long-term perspectives of this situation? What can an international system
for protecting competition look like in the long run? Two basic perspectives
can be outlined: One perspective is that such a pragmatic approach, which
fosters the discussion between dierent countries and their competition author-
ities, eventually will lead to a uniform global competition law or { at least { to
a quasi-harmonisation of national competition laws. If the dierences between
the competition laws disappeared, many of the current problems would vanish.
From this perspective, the current situation with many dierent competition
laws on two or three dierent levels does constitute only an intermediate phase,
which in the long run would be replaced by one quasiuniform set of global com-
petition rules. Another perspective proceeds from the more sceptical assumption
that it will not be possible for all countries to agree on one uniform set of com-
petition rules, even in the long run. There will always be dierent objectives
of competition laws and dierent theories about what competition is and what
rules are necessary for the protection of competition. Therefore, the coexistence
of dierent competition laws should be seen as a permanent feature of an inter-
national system of competition laws, implying that substantial decentralisation
and variety will remain a major characteristic of such an international system,
also in the long run. This paper will focus on the second perspective, which can
be characterised as an evolutionary one: The objectives of competition policy
in dierent countries might change and remain dierent; competition theories
mightevolve through academic progress; the rules for the protection of competi-
tion might have to change due to new anticompetitive business practices or new
technology (such as the Internet). From this evolutionary perspective, it is cru-
cial that an international system for the protection of competition should also
include the long-term capability of adapting quickly to new competition prob-
lems, particularly by fostering legal innovations for improving the protection of
competition. One important argument for a more decentralised international
system of competition laws will be that decentralisation will increase the capa-
bility of the system for innovation and learning in regard to the development of
eective legal rules for the protection of competition. But what can a workable
international system with dierent competition laws and enforcement agencies
on dierent levels, i.e., a decentralised international system of competition laws,
look like? This paper can only present some considerations about this problem.
But its goal is to outline an analytical framework, which can be used for de-
signing a workable multi-level system of competition laws. The main idea is
that we should apply economic theories about federalism and the advantages
and disadvantages of centralisation and decentralisation to develop arguments
about the appropriate institutional structure of an international multi-level sys-
tem of competition laws. The theories that are used in this paper are the
economic theory of federalism, the attempts to apply the concept of federalism
to legal rules as well (legal federalism), and the theories of interjurisdictional
and regulatory competition. The paper is structured as follows. In section II it
is shown that the present situation can be interpreted as being already rather
close to a kind of threelevel system of competition laws and that many current
issues in European and international competition policy can be interpreted asdiscussions about problems of the horizontal and vertical delimitation of com-
petencies within such a three-level system. In the main section III an analytical
framework concerning the potential advantages and disadvantages of centrali-
sation and decentralisation of competition policy will be developed on the basis
of economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition. This will in-
clude a (still incomplete) set of criteria for regulatory federalism in competition
law. Some conclusions for reconstructing international competition policy as a
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I.  Introduction 
Since the 1990s, an intensive discussion on the necessity and the potential 
design of international competition policy has developed. As a preliminary 
result, some general tendencies can be observed:1 
                                                 
1   For overviews of the discussion on the introduction of international competition rules 
see Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade 
and Legal System, 27/6 J. World Trade L. 35 (1993); Scherer, Competition Policies 
for an Integrated World, 1994; Fikentscher & Immenga (eds.), Draft International 
Antitrust Code, 1995; Fox & Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade 
Law, 19/2 World Competition 5 (1995); European Commission, Competition Policy 
in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules, Report 
of the Group of Experts, 12 July 1995, Doc. COM(95)359 final; Brittan & van Miert, 
Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, 24 Int’l Bus. Law. 454 
(1996); Basedow, Weltkartellrecht – Ausgangslage und Ziele, Methoden und Grenzen 
der internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
1998;  Fox, International Antitrust: Against Minimum Rules, for Cosmopolitan 
Principles, 43/1 Antitrust Bulletin 5 (1998);  Janow, Unilateral and Bilateral 
Approaches to Competition Policy  – Drawing on the Trade Experience, in: 1 
Brooking Trade Forum 1998;  Monopolkommission, Marktöffnung umfassend 
verwirklichen, Hauptgutachten XII. 1996/97, 1998, p. 351-367; Drexl, Trade-Related 
Restraints of Competition  – The Competition Policy Approach, in:  Zäch (ed.), 
Towards WTO Competition Rules, 1999, p. 225;  First, Towards an International 
Common Law of Competition, in:  Zäch (ed.), Towards WTO Competition Rules, 
1999, p. 95; Petersmann, Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and 
Intenational Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO “Linking 
Principles” for Trade and Competition, 34/1 New England L. Rev.  145 (1999); 
Kerber, Wettbewerbspolitik als nationale und internationale Aufgabe, in:  Apolte & 
Caspers & Welfens (eds.), Standortwettbewerb  – Wirtschaftspolitische Rationalität 
und internationale Ordnungspolitik, 1999, p. 242; International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee (ICPAC), Final Report, 2000; Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in 
Global Competition Policy, 94/3 Am. J. Int’l. L. 478 (2000); Wins, Eine internationale 
Wettbewerbsordnung als Ergänzung zum GATT, 2000;  Amato, International 
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•  Many states (including the U.S. a nd the EU) and most antitrust 
experts hold the opinion that the traditional system of national 
competition laws (including their extra-territorial application) is not 
sufficient for the protection of competition in the new millennium. 
Therefore, some kind  of international arrangement in regard to 
competition rules seems to be necessary. 
•  The introduction of substantive international competition rules with 
an international competition authority and a corresponding court (in 
analogy to the supranational European competition law) is not seen 
as feasible and/or desirable. Thus the solution should not be sought in 
centralised global competition rules but be based primarily upon 
national competition laws and authorities. 
•  Consequently, the main thrust of the discussion has shifted from the 
idea of a larger harmonisation and convergence of national 
competition laws to the problem of better international enforcement 
of these laws. Although bilateral cooperation between national 
competition authorities have become an increasingly important issue, 
bilateral cooperation agreements are considered only a first step to a 
more preferable multilateral (or plurilateral) solution (e.g. within the 
WTO). 
•  Generally, the path to international competition rules is seen as a 
pragmatic, step-by-step approach, which can achieve its aim only in 
the long run. The currently favoured informal network approach, 
which remains without commitment and emphasizes primarily the 
gathering, discussion and exchange of information between national 
competition authorities, is in line with such a pragmatic approach to 
the incremental evolution of international competition rules.2 
                                                                                                               
Antitrust: What Future?, 24/4 World Competition 451 (2001);  Grewlich, 
Globalization and Conflict in Competition Law – Elements of Possible Solutions, 
24/3 World Competition 367 (2001); Fullerton & Mazard, International Antitrust Co-
operation Agreements, 24/3 World Competition 405 (2001);  Janow & Lewis, 
International Antitrust and the Global Economy, 24/1 World Competition 3 (2001); 
Drexl, Do We Need “Courage” for International Antitrust Law? – Choosing Between 
Supranational and International Law Principles of Enforcement, (in this volume); 
Budzinski, Perspektiven einer internationalen Politik gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, in: List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 28, 
2002, p. 233-252. 
2   For an overview and analysis of the International Competition Network and other 
antitrust networks see  Budzinski, Institutional Aspects of Complex International 
Competition Policy Arrangements, in:  Esser & Stierle & Maurin (eds.), Current 
Issues in Competition Theory and Policy, (forthcoming);  First, Evolving Toward 
What? The Development of International Antitrust, (in this volume). 
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How can we describe the present situation from a global perspective? We 
have a multitude of national competition laws and enforcement agencies 
(competition authorities, courts) with more or less different substantive and 
procedural rules. Different competition laws and enforcement agencies can 
also exist within a (kind of) federal system, as to some degree within the U.S. 
and to a larger extent within the EU, where European competition rules and 
national competition laws coexist on two different levels. Since the 
competencies of these competition laws and enforcement agencies overlap, 
many external effects and conflicts can emerge.  Up to now we cannot 
reasonably argue that this complex structure of competition laws forms an 
integrated system for protecting competition in international markets. The 
establishment of international competition rules (as well as the less ambitious 
international network approach), which on one side should help to solve the 
problems of the current situation, can, on the other side, increase the 
complexity of the system, because an additional vertical regulatory level in 
regard to competition rules would be i ntroduced – including new potential 
conflicts of competencies. 
But what are the long-term perspectives of this situation? What can an 
international system for protecting competition look like in the long run? Two 
basic perspectives can be outlined: 
One perspective is that such a pragmatic approach, which fosters the 
discussion between different countries and their competition authorities, 
eventually will lead to a uniform global competition law or – at least – to a 
quasi-harmonisation of national competition laws. If the differences between 
the competition laws disappeared, many of the current problems would 
vanish. From this perspective, the current situation with many different 
competition laws on two or three different levels does constitute only an 
intermediate phase, which in the long run would be replaced by one quasi-
uniform set of global competition rules. 
Another perspective proceeds from the more sceptical assumption that it will 
not be possible for all countries to agree on one uniform set of competition 
rules, even in the long run. There will always be different objectives of 
competition laws and different theories about what competition is and what 
rules are necessary for the protection of competition. Therefore, the 
coexistence of different competition laws should be seen as a permanent 
feature of an international system of competition laws, implying that 
substantial decentralisation and variety will remain a major characteristic of 
such an international system, also in the long run. 
This paper will focus on the second perspective, which can be characterised 
as an evolutionary one: The objectives of competition policy in different 
countries might change and remain different; competition theories might 
5 Kerber: An International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws: Fed
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evolve through academic progress; the rules for the protection of competition 
might have to change due to new anticompetitive business practices or new 
technology (such as the Internet). From this evolutionary perspective, it is 
crucial that an international system for the protection of competition should 
also include the long-term capability of adapting quickly to new competition 
problems, particularly by fostering legal innovations for improving the 
protection of competition. One important argument for a more decentralised 
international system of competition laws will be that decentralisation will 
increase the capability of the system for innovation and learning in regard to 
the development of effective legal rules for the protection of competition. 
But what can a workable international system with different competition laws 
and enforcement agencies on different levels, i.e., a decentralised 
international system of competition laws, look like? This paper can only 
present some considerations about this problem. But its goal is to outline an 
analytical framework, which can be used for designing a workable multi-level 
system of competition laws. The main idea is that we should apply economic 
theories about federalism and the advantages and disadvantages of 
centralisation and decentralisation to develop arguments about the appropriate 
institutional structure of an international multi-level system of competition 
laws. The theories that are used in this paper are the economic theory of 
federalism, the attempts to apply the concept of federalism to legal rules as 
well (legal federalism),3 and the theories of interjurisdictional and regulatory 
competition.4 
The paper is structured as follows. In section II it is shown that the present 
situation can be interpreted as being already rather close to a kind of three-
                                                 
3   The application of the concept of federalism to competition policy is a rather new 
approach. First attempts can be found in Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: 
Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1781 (2000); Guzman, Antitrust 
and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1142 (2001); and 
particularly  Van den Bergh & Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics – A Comparative Perspective, 2001, p. 125-165. 
4   This paper is part of a larger research project which generally explores the possibility 
and preconditions of decentralised multi-level legal systems (see Kerber & Heine, Zur 
Gestaltung von Mehr-Ebenen-Rechtssystemen aus ökonomischer Sicht, in: Schäfer & 
Ott (eds.), Vereinheitlichung des Zivilrechts in transnationalen Wirtschaftsräumen, 
Ergebnisse des 8. Travemünder Symposiums zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts 
(forthcoming). Other research projects inquire into centralisation and decentralisation 
in European contract law (see Grundmann & Kerber, European System of Contract 
Laws – A Map for Combining the Advantages of Centralised and Decentralised Rule-
making, in: Grundmann & Stuyck (eds.), An Academic Green Paper on European 
Contract Law, 2002, p. 291), and regulatory competition between European corporate 
laws (see Heine & Kerber, European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and 
Path Dependency, 13 European Journal of Law and Economics 47 (2002)). 
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level system of competition laws and that many current issues in European 
and international competition policy can be interpreted as discussions about 
problems of the horizontal and vertical delimitation of competencies within 
such a three-level system. In the main section III an analytical framework 
concerning the potential advantages and disadvantages of centralisation and 
decentralisation of competition policy will be developed on the basis of 
economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition. This will include 
a (still incomplete) set of criteria for regulatory federalism in competition 
law. Some conclusions for reconstructing international competition policy as 
a multi-level system of competition laws are presented in section IV. 
II.  Towards an International Multi-Level System of 
Competition Laws 
A.  Competition Law Regimes on Different Levels 
A competition law regime can be seen as consisting of substantive legal rules 
for protecting competition on one hand and an enforcement system on the 
other hand. The latter includes procedural rules, the competition authorities 
(such as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in the U.S.), the 
courts (such as the European Court of Justice for European competition law), 
and also private parties, if they have the right to sue firms for breaking 
competition laws (private litigation). In that respect competition laws can be 
enforced both by public and private agencies. So if we consider a multi-level 
system of competition law regimes for solving international competition 
problems, we have to take into account the basic elements: substantive 
competition rules, enforcement agencies and the courts. 
7 Kerber: An International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws: Fed













Figure 1: A three-level system of competition law regimes 
 
 
If we include the current discussion about the establishment of an 
international level of competition policy, we are already very close to a kind 
of three-level system of competition law regimes. Within the EU, competition 
laws, competition authorities and the corresponding courts already exist on 
two levels: (1) the national competition laws of the Member States of the EU, 
e.g. the German Law against Restraints of Competition (GWB), enforced by 
the national competition authorities (e.g. the Bundeskartellamt in Germany) 
and national courts, and (2) the European competition rules (Art. 81, 82 EC 
Treaty, Merger Regulation), the European Commission as competition 
authority and the European courts. Also in the U.S., competition laws and 
enforcement agencies exist on two different levels: On the federal level, there 
are the federal antitrust laws, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) as federal enforcement agencies, and the federal 
courts. But there are also state antitrust statutes, and state attorneys can act as 
independent enforcement agencies of the states.5 The establishment of 
competition rules on an international level would imply the emergence of a 
three-level system of competition laws (of course, for most states outside the 
EU and the U.S., it would be a two-level system). And on each of these three 
                                                 
5   See  Ginsburg & Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons from Our 
Federalism, 68 Antitrust L.J. 219 (2000); First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the 
States in Antitrust Enforcement, George Washington L. Rev. 1701 (2001); Grimes, 
Microsoft Litigation and Federalism in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for 
International Competition Law (in this volume). 
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levels, substantive competition rules, competition authorities and courts can 
exist. Figure 1 illustrates such a structure. 
Within a multi-level system the three elements of competition law regimes 
(substantive rules, competition authorities and courts) can be combined 
between the levels in very different ways. European competition rules, for 
example, can be applied directly in the Member States by national 
competition authorities and the national courts (also e.g. in private litigation). 
So enforcement agencies on a lower level might have the right to apply also 
substantive competition rules of a higher level. Therefore, the introduction of 
an international level of protecting competition does not imply the necessity 
to introduce simultaneously international competition rules, an international 
competition authority and an international court. Instead, the problem of 
protecting competition on international markets might also  be solved by 
international procedural rules on the first level, which ensure the enforcement 
of second-level competition laws by second-level enforcement agencies.6 The 
decisive point is that there is a wide range of options for the design of a multi-
level system of competition law regimes. 
B.  Horizontal and Vertical Delimitation of Competencies 
1.  Competence Problems in a Multiple Competition Law 
Regime  
A crucial problem in a world of multiple competition law regimes is that 
usually the geographical scope of the effects of anticompetitive behaviour is 
not identical with the geographical scope of the jurisdictions, each with its 
own competition law regime. One competition case, e.g. a merger or a price-
fixing cartel, can have anticompetitive effects in several relevant markets, 
which might extend over a number of different jurisdictions. Which of the 
several jurisdictions that are negatively affected by a competition case should 
deal with the problem? In a multi-level system the question arises how the 
competencies of competition laws and enforcement agencies should be 
delineated. In a first step we deal with the horizontal delimitation of 
competencies, that is, between the competition law regimes of the same level, 
before we turn, in a second step, to the vertical delimitation of competencies – 
between the competition law regimes of different levels. 
                                                 
6   See e.g. the Draft International Antitrust Code (Fikentscher & Immenga, supra n. 1, p. 
53-110), that can be interpreted in this way. 
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2.  Horizontal Delimitation of Competencies 
The relationship between different competition law regimes of the same 
jurisdictional level, such as nation states, is characterised by two main 
problems: 
(1) Nearly all competition laws combat only those restraints of competition 
which have negative effects on competition within the territory of their 
jurisdictions. For example, in European merger control the Commission 
analyses w hether a merger leads to the emergence or strengthening of a 
dominant position within the common market of the European Union. 
Whether this merger leads to market dominance in Brazil is irrelevant for EC 
merger control. A more extreme, well-known case are export cartels, which 
were allowed under most competition laws. As a consequence of this neglect 
of domestic restraints of competition which have their negative effects 
abroad, nearly all countries apply the “effects doctrine”, i.e. they claim that 
their national competition law regimes have the right also to combat restraints 
of competition which take place in other countries but have negative effects 
on competition in domestic markets. But since the extra-territorial 
enforcement of competition laws is difficult and often impossible, the 
national competition authorities are often not able to deal effectively with 
those restraints of competition.7  
Thus, the first main problem is that competition might not be protected 
enough if there are negative effects of restraints of competition on other 
jurisdictions. The “effects doctrine” – as a kind of rule for the definition of 
competencies within competition law regimes – can only be a very imperfect 
solution. But bilateral cooperation agreements between national competition 
authorities concerning mutual assistance in the extra-territorial enforcement 
of national competition laws might help to solve those problems of under-
enforcement of competition laws in the case of international competition 
problems.8 
(2) In the last two decades more and more countries have enacted competition 
laws (including merger controls) and, thus, the number of competition cases 
affecting several countries has increased. The overlapping of competencies – 
as a logical consequence of the effects doctrine  – can become a difficult 
problem. This is particularly true for merger cases. Often international 
mergers have to pass through several national merger reviews at the same 
                                                 
7   See Basedow, supra n. 1, p. 11-37, for an overview of the extra-territorial application 
of national competition laws and its problems. 
8   For an overview of bilateral cooperation agreements in regard to competition policy 
see Fullerton & Mazard, supra n. 1. 
10 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2003,  Paper 13
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time.9 This leads (a) to considerable transaction costs, both for the 
competition authorities and for the merging firms, and (b) to a range of 
potential conflicts, because the national competition authorities can come to 
different evaluations of the same merger case (including perhaps different 
requirements for the modification of the merger). One of the most prominent 
cases which was assessed with different results was the Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas merger. Potential solutions for these problems consist of proper 
horizontal delimitation of competencies, which would reduce or avoid the 
overlapping of competencies. This can be carried out by establishing bilateral 
or multilateral rules  – like negative or positive comity  – channelling 
international cases to only one of the involved competition authorities, which 
would take the lead in treating the case in question (lead jurisdiction).10 
3.  Vertical Delimitation of Competencies 
Another solution for these horizontal problems is the introduction of a higher-
level competition law. Specifically, the European competition law can be 
understood  in that way. It is based upon the conviction that the national 
competition laws of the Member States are not able to protect competition 
within the EU sufficiently. The European competition law regime is a fully 
developed competition law with its own enforcement agency and its own 
court system.11 The main advantage of the introduction of a higher-level 
competition law within the EU is that competition problems which affect 
several Member States can be dealt with on the higher level, thus avoiding 
both the problems of insufficient enforcement and the costs of multiple 
procedures and conflicts. Therefore, within a two-level system of competition 
laws the problems of delimiting horizontal competencies are reduced. 
However, the new problem of vertical delimitation arises: which competition 
                                                 
9   For the problems of multi-jurisdictional merger reviews and potential solutions see 
Halverson, Harmonization and Coordination of International Merger Procedures, 60 
Antitrust L.J. 531 (1992); Campbell & Trebilcock, International Merger Review – 
Problems of Multi-Jurisdictional Conflict, in: Kantzenbach & Scharrer & Wavermann 
(eds.), Competition Policy in an Interdependent World Economy, 1993, p. 129; Janow 
& Lewis, supra n. 1, 5-12; Davidow, United States Antitrust Developments in the New 
Millennium, 24/3 World Competition 425, 439 et seq. (2002). 
10   See Trebilcock & Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling 
Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 European Journal of Law and 
Economics 5 (1993). 
11   The introduction of an entirely independent system on the EU level was necessary, 
because in the past many Member States did not have effective national competition 
law regimes. 
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problems should be solved by the higher-level competition law regime and 
which by the lower-level ones?12  
How, for example, are the competencies delineated between the two different 
levels of competition laws within the EU? 
Mergers: In regard to merger cases there is a clear-cut delimitation of 
competencies between the European merger control and the national merger 
controls. “One-stop control” was one of the basic principles of the 
introduction of the European Merger Regulation  in 1989: a merger case 
should be either a European case (“Community dimension”) or a national 
case. The criteria for allocating merger cases to the European level are 
turnover thresholds (Art. 1 Merger Regulation). If these are fulfilled, the 
merger has a  “Community dimension” and is subject to European merger 
control. Particularly all large mergers with a minimum turnover in the EU are 
controlled by the Commission. An exception was made for those large 
mergers which have at least two-thirds of their turnover within one Member 
State. They are seen as national mergers and regulated by national authorities. 
From the beginning of European merger control there was an intensive 
discussion about whether this vertical delimitation is adequate. The 
Commission always wanted to reduce the turnover thresholds, implying that 
more merger cases would be shifted from the national to the European level. 
Already in the first reform of the Merger Regulation in 1998, the thresholds 
were modified to a certain extent to alleviate the problems of multiple 
notification of mergers that simultaneously affect several Member States but 
have no Community dimension. The recently published Green Paper on the 
reform of merger control hints in the same direction.13 Clearly, the problem of 
the vertical delimitation between the European and the national merger 
control regulations is a permanent issue.14 
Cartels and Abuse of Dominant Positions: The situation is entirely different 
in regard to cartels and the abuse of dominant positions. Art. 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty can be applied if the restraints of competition “may affect trade 
between member states”. Since this criterion is interpreted very widely, many 
restraints of competition and abuses of dominant positions are subject to these 
                                                 
12   Additionally, we have to distinguish between the competencies of the competition 
laws and the competencies of the competition authorities on both levels. 
13   See  Baron, Die neuen Bestimmungen der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, 1997 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (WuW) 579; European Commission, Green Paper of 11 
December 2001 on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 
COM(2001) 745 final; European Commission, XXXI. Report on Competition Policy 
2001, 2002, p. 61 et seq. 
14   But it is primarily a problem of the vertical delimitation of substantive rules, and not 
one of the vertical delimitation of the competencies of competition authorities. 
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European competition rules, even if the relevant market does not extend 
beyond one Member State.15 Consequently, in both cases the competencies of 
the European and national competition law regimes overlap, both in regard to 
the substantive competition rules and the enforcement agencies. Additionally, 
the national competition authorities and courts can also apply the European 
competition rules. Although the application of the European rules does not 
preclude the parallel application of the national rules, in the case of conflicts 
the European rules prevail. Therefore, regarding cartels and the abuse of 
dominant positions there is no clear vertical demarcation of competencies 
between the two levels. The long-term effect of this overlap in combination 
with the power of the national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 
81 and 82 is the decrease in importance of the national substantive 
competition rules. 
The vertical delimitation of competencies is also one of the core issues in the 
modernisation debate concerning Regulation 17 of European competition law. 
The proposals and their discussion cannot be considered in detail here. But it 
is important to note that the Commission would give up its monopoly on 
exemptions according to Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. The proposals end up in 
complicated rules concerning the competencies of the Commission, the 
national competition authorities and the national courts to enforce Art. 81 
and, particularly, the exemptions of Art. 81 (3). One suggestion is that there 
should be intensive vertical cooperation between the national and the 
European competition authorities. Despite provisions that the Commission 
should have special rights to control the exemption policy and monitor the 
exemptions, there can be no doubt that the enforcement would be much more 
decentralised than in the present system of prior notification.16 But this 
discussion of the vertical delimitation of competencies treats only the 
                                                 
15   See Korah, EC Competition Law and Practice, 2000, p. 51-58. 
16   See European Commission, White Paper of 28 April 1999 on modernisation of the 
rules implementing articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Working Programm of the 
Commission No. 99/027;  Temple Lang, Decentralised  Application of Community 
Competition Law, 22/4 World Competition 3 (1999);  Mestmäcker, Versuch einer 
kartellpolitischen Wende in der EU, 1999 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 
(EZW) 523;  Ehlermann, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and 
Cultural Revolution, 37 C.M.L. Rev. 537 (2000);  Monopolkommission, 
Kartellpolitische Wende in der Europäischen Union? Zum Weißbuch der Kommission 
vom 28. April 1999, Sondergutachten 28 gemäß Art. 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB, 1999; 
Fox, The Elusive Promise of Modernisation: Europe and the World, Leg. Iss. Eur. 
Integr. 141 (2001); and Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 140 et seq. The 
central point of the discussion is whether such a more decentralised system for the 
enforcement of Art. 81 EC Treaty can be as effective in protecting competition as the 
present one, because the system of prior notification exemptions of Art. 81 (3) shall 
be given up. 
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competencies of second- and third-level enforcement agencies (see Figure 1) 
to apply the substantive competition rules on the second level, and not the 
vertical delimitation of competencies between the substantive competition 
rules on both levels. Consequently, the Commission’s strategy of 
decentralisation refers only to the application of European competition rules. 
C.  Conclusions 
In this section it was shown that the present structure of competition law 
regimes is not far away from a kind of three-level system of competition law 
regimes, if we take into account the proposals for introducing international 
competition rules as an additional level of competition law regimes. But up to 
now, it cannot be argued that this kind of multi-level structure of competition 
law regimes forms an integrated, consistent system of competition laws and 
enforcement agencies which satisfactorily protects competition on 
international markets. Even within the EU there are so many inconsistencies 
in regard to the horizontal and, particularly, the vertical delimitation of 
competencies that the structure of competition laws within the EU cannot be 
regarded as an integrated two-level system of competition laws. We have 
seen that many recent discussions in competition policy, both in regard to the 
reforms within the EU and in regard to international competition rules, can be 
interpreted a s discussions about the proper horizontal and vertical 
delimitation of competencies in a three-level system of competition laws. An 
important result of our analysis is that the horizontal and vertical delimitation 
of competencies of the substantial competition rules, the competition 
authorities and the courts is the crucial problem that has to be solved in such a 
complex multi-level structure of competition law regimes. 
It is the main thesis of this paper that this emerging three-tier structure should 
not be seen as a transitory phenomenon that eventually will be replaced by a 
new global one-level competition law regime. Instead, we must accept the 
fact that, even in the long run, we will have a multi-level system of 
competition law regimes – with more or less different substantive rules and a 
number of different enforcement agencies on different jurisdictional levels. 
Therefore, we must ask how such an international multi-level system of 
competition laws should be designed, and which institutional framework  is 
necessary for the proper working of such an integrated system. For solving 
this problem, I want to suggest in the second half of this paper that the 
economic theory of federalism might provide a theoretical framework for the 
development of an international multi-level system of competition law 
regimes. Particularly, we will see that the economic theory of federalism can 
provide arguments for the case that a multi-level system of competition laws 
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might even be a superior solution to a uniform one-level competition law 
regime. 
III.  Regulatory Federalism in Competition Law: 
Arguments for and against Centralisation and 
Decentralisation 
A.  Economic Theories of Federalism and Regulatory 
Competition: An Introduction 
In the well-established economic theory of fiscal federalism a number of 
criteria have been developed on the appropriate extent of centralisation and 
decentralisation of the provision of public goods, redistribution, and taxation 
within a federal multi-level system of jurisdictions. The most important 
criteria are the geographical scope of public goods (the problem of spill over-
effects), geographical heterogeneity of preferences, economies of scale 
effects, transaction costs (within the federal system), rent-seeking arguments, 
the extent of decentralised information and the advantages of decentralised 
experimentation.17 Since the 1990s the theory of fiscal federalism has been 
complemented by the theory of interjurisdictional competition (or: systems 
competition, institutional competition, locational competition), which 
analyses the competition of different states, regions or cities for mobile 
resources (primarily investors).18 This was necessary because in a federal state 
                                                 
17   See e.g. Oates, Fiscal Federalism, 1972; Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 
Journal of Economic Literature 1120 (1999); Breton, Competitive Goverments – An 
Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance, 1996. 
18   See e.g.  Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 Journal of Political 
Economy 416 (1956);  Siebert & Koop, Institutional Competition. A Concept for 
Europe? 45 Aussenwirtschaft 439 (1990);  Kenyon & Kincaid  (eds.), Competition 
Among States and Local Goverments  – Efficiency and Equity in American 
Federalism, 1991; Vanberg & Kerber, Institutional Competition Among Jurisdictions: 
An Evolutionary Approach, 5 Constitutional Political Economy 193 (1994); Bratton 
& McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary 
Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Georgetown L.J. 201 (1997);  Sinn, The 
Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition, 88 J. Publ. Econ. 247 
(1997); Kerber, Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnung für den Systemwettbewerb, 
in: 17 Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 199 (1998); Oates, supra n. 17, 37 
Journal of Economic Literature 1120 (1999). 
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with substantial decentralisation the increasing competition among lower-
level jurisdictions is a logical consequence of the rising mobility of 
individuals, firms and production factors. This led to the concept of 
competitive federalism. 
A particularly important issue in the discussion of the appropriate degree of 
centralisation or decentralisation in federal multi-level systems of 
jurisdictions is whether competitive federalism leads primarily to positive or 
negative effects. Whereas the proponents of competitive federalism 
emphasize the positive effects in terms of greater efficiency and more 
innovation, other scholars believe that interjurisdictional competition might 
lead to an under-provision of public goods and redistribution due to a cut-
throat tax competition. The preliminary result of this discussion in economics 
about the pros and cons of centralisation or decentralisation is that (1) federal 
multi-level systems of jurisdictions with a substantial degree of 
decentralisation can be recommended, (2) the specific vertical allocation of 
competencies within such multi-level systems depends on a number of 
criteria, and (3) also interjurisdictional competition can be workable within an 
appropriate institutional framework, but a differentiated analysis is necessary. 
It is important for our discussion that the theories of fiscal federalism a nd 
interjurisdictional competition have developed a number of criteria which can 
help to solve the problem of how a federal multi-level system of jurisdictions 
should be conceived. 
However, the conclusions we can draw from these theories for our problem of 
a multi-level system of competition laws still remain limited, because the 
economic theories of federalism and interjurisdictional competition have been 
primarily developed for the provision of public goods, redistribution, and 
taxation, and not for the provision of legal rules and regulations. The question 
of how to allocate competencies for regulations within a multi-level system of 
jurisdictions has not been treated in a systematic way. This means that an 
economic theory of legal federalism, i.e., an economic theory of the design of 
a multi-level system of law, is still in its infancy. But in the context of 
European integration problems, this topic was dealt with by asking whether 
legal rules and regulations should be harmonised on a European level or 
remain decentralised. The discussion on the consequences of the  Cassis de 
Dijon Judgment of the European Court of Justice (principle of mutual 
recognition) triggered a controversy over the merits and dangers of regulatory 
competition. In combination with the well-known debate on competition 
among corporate laws in the U.S., a theory of regulatory competition began to 
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emerge, which has been dominated by the problem of whether regulatory 
competition would lead to a “race to the bottom” or to a “race to the top”.19 
But combining the insights of the economic theory of federalism on one hand 
and the discussions on harmonisation vs. decentralisation of regulations and 
on regulatory competition on the other hand can provide a number of well-
founded arguments dealing with the issue of whether to allocate regulations to 
the top level of a federal system of jurisdictions or to lower levels. Therefore 
it is conceivable to develop an elaborated concept of legal federalism, i.e., a 
concept of multi-level legal systems, in which competencies for the making 
of legal rules exist on different levels of jurisdictions. Similar to the above-
mentioned set of criteria for the allocation of public goods to different levels 
of jurisdictions, it might also be possible to develop criteria for allocating 
legal rules and regulations to different levels of jurisdictions. Up to now, 
there have only been initial approaches attempting to develop such sets of 
criteria.20 The first results of the application of these criteria to real-world 
regulations show that the extreme options of total centralisation or 
decentralisation do not seem to be the best solutions. Presumably, skilfully 
conceived intermediate options between centralisation and decentralisation 
within a multi-level system of jurisdictions will be more appropriate 
solutions. 
In this section, several criteria for the vertical allocation of regulatory 
competencies in a multi-level system of jurisdictions will be presented and 
applied to our problem, to which jurisdictional level the solution of 
competition problems should be allocated. It should be clear that in this paper 
we cannot solve the problem of how a multi-level system of competition law 
regimes should look. So only some of these criteria can be analysed in regard 
                                                 
19   For the theory of regulatory competition see Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 225 
(1985);  Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harvard L. Rev. 1435 (1992); Sun & Pelkmans, 
Regulatory Competition in the Single Market, 33 Journal of Common Market Studies 
67 (1995); Streit & Mussler, Wettbewerb der Systeme und das Binnenmarktprogramm 
der Europäischen Union, in: Gerken (ed.), Europa zwischen Ordnungswettbewerb und 
Harmonisierung, 1995, p. 75;  Sinn, supra n. 18;  Kerber, Interjurisdictional 
Competition within the European Union, 23 Fordham Int’l L. J. 217 (2000); Van den 
Bergh, Towards an Institutional Legal Framework  for Regulatory Competition in 
Europe, 53 Kyklos 435 (2000);  Heine, Regulierungswettbewerb im 
Gesellschaftsrecht. Zur Funktionsfähigkeit eines Wettbewerbs der Rechtsordnungen 
im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht (forthcoming). 
20   See e.g. Grundmann & Kerber, supra n. 3; Kerber & Heine, supra n. 3; Van den 
Bergh, Forced Harmonisation of Contract Law in Europe – Not to Be Continued, in: 
Grundmann & Stuyck, supra n. 3, where preliminary sets of criteria can be found. 
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to competition law.21 But I want to give an impression of how the problem 
can be addressed from the perspective of a theory of legal federalism. The 
question can be posed both for substantive competition rules (section III.B) 
and for the corresponding enforcement system (section III.C). The specific 
problem of regulatory competition, which might emerge in a decentralised 
system of competition law regimes, can only be discussed briefly. So in the 
following, the specific advantages and disadvantages of centralisation and 
decentralisation of competition law regimes will be discussed. 
B.  Centralisation or Decentralisation of Competition 
Laws: Some Criteria 
1.  Economies of Scale and Transaction Costs  
Static economies of scale: The drafting of laws, the decision processes of the 
legislators and the implementation of laws can cause considerable costs, 
which can be interpreted as fixed costs (setup costs). Also, the building up of 
specific human capital for competition law and its application by legal 
scholars, lawyers, judges, and the staff of competition authorities has the 
character of fixed costs. In contrast to these fixed costs, the marginal costs of 
applying the competition rules are small. Thus, from an economic point of 
view, the production and application of competition laws can  imply 
economies of scale effects, i.e., the average cost of protecting competition by 
a competition law regime declines with an increasing number of cases. As a 
consequence, a global competition law regime – with uniform legal rules and 
one system of enforcement (including the judicial system)  – would 
economize on these fixed costs. In contrast to that, a multi-level system of 
competition law regimes would lead to considerably higher fixed costs for 
setting up many different competition law regimes. So a uniform (and 
therefore centralised) competition law can save costs due to economies of 
scale. 
Dynamic economies of scale: In regard to the utility and the costs of legal 
rules, dynamic economies of scale also have to be taken into account. It is 
well known that the quality of a law depends on the number of cases that have 
been decided on the basis of this law, because a large set of decisions in the 
                                                 
21   For the criteria see Kerber & Heine, supra n. 3. For the application of some of these 
criteria to competition policy see also Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 125 
et seq. 
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past can be taken as cumulating experience and knowledge for solving legal 
problems. This increases the quality of the law for the solving of transaction 
problems and the users of the law can more easily predict what kind of 
behaviour is legal or illegal. This stabilizes the expectations of firms. So a 
long established competition law regime might have a higher quality than a 
new one. For our problem of centralised and decentralised competition laws 
those dynamic economies of scale seem to be an argument for one uniform 
competition law, because the fewer competition laws exist, the greater is the 
body of decisions o f the courts which are based upon those laws, and the 
quicker the quality of the competition law regimes increases. 
But we also have to take into account that the legal development can be 
characterised by path dependencies, which might lead to the problem  of 
inefficient legal rules prevailing for a long time (lock-in effects).22 If such 
path dependencies with a lock-in of inefficient competition rules emerge in 
the case of a centralised, uniform competition law, this might imply a much 
greater danger to competition than in a more decentralised system of 
competition laws, in which different competition laws co-exist. Additionally, 
we have to take into account that a process of centralisation by introducing 
new competition rules on a higher level implies that much of the experience 
and knowledge which has been accumulated in the previously existing lower-
level competition law regimes will become useless and eventually be lost. At 
the same time, the new competition rules on the higher level will suffer from 
their lack of experience for a certain amount of time. Therefore, the argument 
of dynamic economies of scale is ambivalent in regard to the question of 
centralisation or decentralisation. 
Transaction costs: The existence of different competition laws can also 
increase the costs of doing business in international markets, because firms 
need information about the specific legal rules that have to be respected in 
particular countries. The problem of the costs of having to notify international 
mergers in several countries and having to pass several merger control 
reviews in different countries according to different criteria and procedural 
requirements has been recognized as one of the particular problems of the 
existing system of national competition laws. From an e conomic point of 
view, these costs can be interpreted as transaction costs in the merger’s 
market. Also, the costs to the competition authorities for the assessment of 
mergers can be interpreted as transaction costs, which have to be borne 
several times if parallel merger procedures take place. But information costs 
concerning different competition laws are also important in regard to other 
                                                 
22   For the problem of path dependencies in institutional or legal evolution see North, 
Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990; Kerber & Heine, 
supra n. 3. 
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parts of competition law regimes, as e.g. in the question of what kinds of 
business behaviour are assessed as unfair competition or abuse of a dominant 
position, or what kinds of horizontal or vertical agreements are allowed in 
certain jurisdictions, can be pre-empted under certain conditions or are 
deemed prohibited per se. In a world with different legal rules for protecting 
competition, those information costs will be considerably higher than in a 
world with one uniform competition law regime, implying higher transaction 
costs for the firms on international markets. 
2.  Geographic Scope of Competition Problems  
In the economic theory of federalism, one important argument is that a 
problem should be allocated to that jurisdictional level on which the 
geographical scope of the problem is identical with the territorial scope of the 
jurisdictions. With respect to public goods, this implies that there should be 
no spill-over to other jurisdictions, because otherwise the incentive for the 
provision of these (usually tax-funded) public goods is too low – due to the 
free-rider effects in other jurisdictions. If a spill-over has the form of negative 
external effects (as in environmental problems, public bads), there is a 
tendency towards over-provision of those activities, because not all of these 
costs have to be borne by the jurisdictions in which these activities with 
negative externalities are carried out. So the criterion of the geographical 
scope of a problem can be interpreted as helping to avoid inefficiencies due to 
positive and negative externalities. But economic theory also shows that the 
existence of positive and negative s pill-over effects need not necessarily 
imply that the problem has to be solved by a higher-level jurisdiction. 
Different kinds of bargaining solutions between jurisdictions are also feasible. 
To what extent can such externalities (or spill over-effects) between different 
jurisdictions emerge in regard to restraints of competition and competition 
policy? This problem has already been addressed briefly in section II.B.1 by 
showing that the geographical scope of the negative effects of restraints of 
competition often transcend the territorial scope of jurisdictions, leading to 
problems of the horizontal delimitation of competencies between different 
competition law regimes. In the following, different trans-border cases are 
distinguished. 
Since the protection o f competition in a relevant market is an indivisible 
public good, an externality problem emerges if the size of the geographically 
relevant market23 is larger than the territorial size of the jurisdictions, e.g. if in 
                                                 
23   One unresolved issue is the problem of potential competition from outside the 
geographically relevant market. 
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regard to a merger in Germany the geographically relevant market is the EU, 
but it is not an European case because the turnover thresholds are not 
fulfilled. In that case, German merger control has to provide a public good, 
which can be used within the whole European Union. In such cases, 
economic theory would predict that there is a danger of under-provision of 
protection of competition due to free-rider effects, although the negative 
effects for Germany might constitute a sufficient incentive for the German 
authorities to provide this public good. 
A more important problem is that often one case of competition – a merger, 
for example – might have anticompetitive effects on several markets which 
lie in a number of different jurisdictions. So if one competition authority deals 
with this particular competition case, but only takes into account the potential 
anticompetitive effects on its own domestic territory, it will make a decision 
which does not include the effects of that restraint of competition on markets 
in other jurisdictions. In that respect, it is very probable that the decision will 
not be optimal from the perspective of all the jurisdictions affected by this 
competition case.24 But the problem is not only the neglect of anticompetitive 
effects in other jurisdictions, but the possibility that competition authorities 
decide competition cases deliberately in such a way that the advantages of 
e.g. a merger remain in the domestic jurisdiction, whereas the burden of 
anticompetitive effects is placed on other jurisdictions (strategic competition 
policy). In all of these cases, the decisions of the competition authority of one 
jurisdiction can have negative external effects on other jurisdictions. 
What options for solving these problems exist from the perspective of the 
economic theory of federalism? 
The present solution of the application of the “effects doctrine” is very 
unsatisfactory. It cannot dispel the above-mentioned danger of under-
provision of the public good of protection of competition. In the case of 
negative external effects of the activities (or lack of activities) of the 
competition authorities of particular jurisdictions, the “effects doctrine” 
allows other competition authorities to combat these anticompetitive effects, 
but the problems of the extra-territorial enforcement of competition laws are 
                                                 
24   For economic models, which try to show such problems, see Falvey & Lloyd, An 
Economic Analysis of Extraterritoriality, Center for Research on Globalization and 
Labour Markets, University of Nottingham, Research Paper 99/3, 1999;  Neven & 
Röller, The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust, 44 Europ. Econ. Rev. 
845 (2000);  Kaiser & Vosgerau, Global Harmonisation of National Competition 
Policies, in:  Vosgerau (ed.), Institutional Arrangements for Global Economic 
Integration, 2000, p. 35. See also Fox & Ordover, supra n. 1; Guzman, Is International 
Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1142 (1998); Van den Bergh & Camesasca, 
supra n. 3, p. 145 et seq. 
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well-known as well as the costs and conflicts that can arise from parallel 
antitrust proceedings concerning one competition case. 
The most obvious solution from the economic theory of federalism is to 
establish an identity between the geographical scope of the competition 
problem and the territorial scope of the jurisdiction that has to deal with this 
problem. Therefore, within a multi-level system of competition law regimes 
competition cases should be regulated on that jurisdictional level w hich 
encompasses all jurisdictions that are affected by this restraint of competition. 
Then this jurisdiction can take into account all effects of these competition 
cases and is also able to enforce its decision. Thus, the solution of the 
problems of trans-border cases would be the allocation of the case to a higher-
level competition law regime. 25 But it is clear that this solution leads to a 
considerable centralisation of competition policy, as we can observe in the 
case of European competition policy, which serves as a good example for this 
strategy. From this perspective, the introduction of a full-fledged global 
competition law regime (including substantial competition rules, a 
competition authority and a court) seems to be the logical solution for all 
those competition cases, as e.g. mergers, which can have anticompetitive 
effects in many countries. 
But in the economic theory of federalism additional options for dealing with 
positive and negative externalities (spill-over effects) between different 
jurisdictions have been developed.  Coase showed that, under certain 
conditions, externalities can be internalised by bargaining between the 
affected parties.26 The already existing bilateral agreements on the 
cooperation of national competition authorities can be seen as such an 
instrument for helping to provide the public good of protection of competition 
in trans-border cases and for solving externality problems in regard to the 
decision of competition authorities. These bilateral agreements can refer to 
mutual assistance regarding pure information, cooperation in particular cases, 
and the enforcement of the decisions of the competition authorities. 
Particularly, bilateral cooperation of the competition authorities allows for 
bringing in and taking into account a ll positive and negative competitive 
effects in both countries, which might reduce negative externalities of 
decisions of competition cases considerably. 
A generalisation of those bilateral bargaining solutions for externalities is 
represented by multilateral solutions, in which a number of countries agree on 
common rules for mutual assistance in regard to the exchange of information, 
                                                 
25   In section II.B.3) we already interpreted the introduction of a higher-level competition 
law regime as the solution for horizontal conflicts between different competition law 
regimes. 
26   See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960). 
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cooperation and enforcement. This can be called a club solution. One 
possibility currently being discussed involves proposals that the most 
important competition law regimes agree on common rules regarding the 
procedures and formal requirements for merger reviews. More important for 
the internalisation of external effects would be an agreement of a number of 
jurisdictions on procedural rules determining that only one competition 
authority should investigate a particular competition case, but in regard to 
potential anticompetitive effects in all jurisdictions. Why should the EU 
merger control authority only investigate whether a  particular international 
merger may lead to a dominant position within the EU? It can also assess the 
effects of the merger on Australia, South Africa or Brazil. What is necessary 
in that regard are international rules determining which competition authority 
in which country should review a particular merger, and which countries 
should be included in regard to the assessment of the effects of these mergers. 
But note that club solutions with common rules can be interpreted as the 
introduction of an additional level of competition law regimes, and therefore 
constitute a vertical solution for horizontal problems between jurisdictions. 
But the decisive difference from the solution by higher-level allocation 
discussed above is that on this higher level only procedural rules exist on how 
to deal with problems of externalities.27 
In this section we dealt with the problem that one competition authority does 
not take fully into account all effects of a particular competition case due to 
its geographical limitation. In the following two sections, additional problems 
are discussed which render the problems of internalising externalities much 
more difficult, namely, when the countries differ both as regards the 
objectives of their competition policies and as regards their theories about the 
competitive assessment of the market position and the behaviour of firms. 
3.  Heterogeneity of Preferences and the Objectives of 
Competition Policy 
One important criterion in the economic theory of federalism is the extent of 
the heterogeneity of preferences between different jurisdictions. Since the 
legal rules should correspond to the preferences of the citizens of the 
jurisdictions, the existence of large differences between the preferences of 
different jurisdictions would be an argument i n favour of greater 
                                                 
27   What institutional arrangement is comparatively the best, depends  – according to 
Coase – also on the transaction costs for these different kinds of bargaining solutions. 
The International Competition Network can itself be interpreted as one type of 
institutional arrangement to solve these problems. 
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decentralisation. For in that case the various preferences can be satisfied 
better than in the case of a centralised solution, which might result in an 
unsatisfactory average solution for the citizens of all jurisdictions. The greater 
the heterogeneity between populations in this respect, the higher the cost of 
centralisation, again an argument for decentralisation. 
In regard to competition policy the question is whether different preferences 
in different jurisdictions might lead to different objectives of competition 
policy and thus to different normative criteria and different legal rules for 
assessing mergers and business behaviour. If we compare the competition 
policies of the European Union and the U.S., there is no doubt that the 
normative objectives of both competition laws are not identical. Whereas in 
the U.S. the efficiency approach prevails, the European concept of 
competition, which also includes the aim of integration, protection of small 
and medium firms and the protection against the abuse of dominant market 
positions, has more the characteristic of a multi-goal approach.28 Beyond that, 
in many countries, industrial policies with their aim of fostering the 
international competitiveness of domestic industries can also play an 
important role in competition policies. There can be no doubt that the 
objectives of competition laws are different to some extent between countries. 
This heterogeneity of the objectives of competition law, then, would favour a 
more decentralised approach.29 
But the question arises whether these observable differences should be 
accepted as an argument in an economic discussion about the advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralisation. Two kinds of arguments are important:  
First, many economists think that competition is a clear theoretical concept 
(as e.g. in the neoclassical model of perfect competition) with a definite 
normative meaning (to achieve efficient allocation). In that case, competition 
policy should only pursue economic efficiency, implying that no other 
normative criteria should be taken into account at all. Therefore, different 
objectives of competition policies between different countries can only be a 
consequence of wrong concepts of competition and cannot be a sound 
argument for decentralisation. This view of the problem, however, is too 
simple. For one thing, within economics we have different concepts of 
competition, including different normative concepts, from which different 
objectives of competition law can be derived. Furthermore, other objectives 
                                                 
28   For a thorough analysis of the historical background of the differences between the 
EU and the U.S., see particularly Gerber, The U.S.-European Conflict over the 
Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience Perspective, 34/1 New England 
L. Rev. 123 (1999); for a more general view of potential conflicts among competition 
cultures see Grewlich, supra n. 1, at 376-378. 
29   See also Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 136 et seq. 
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of competition policy beyond economic efficiency are also legitimate, if they 
correspond to the preferences of the citizens. In that respect, we can also 
discuss to what extent cultural differences influence the general attitude of a 
society towards market competition or what kind of competition is seen as 
preferable. 
The second, and more important, objection is that the objectives of 
competition policy in a country might not reflect entirely the preferences of 
the constituency, but might be influenced and therefore distorted by rent-
seeking activities of interest groups. That is the problem of the political 
economy of competition policy. From an economic point of view, differences 
in the objectives of competition policy which do not reflect differences of the 
preferences of the constituency, but have their cause in differences of rent-
seeking activities, are no legitimate argument in favour of decentralisation.30 
4.  Heterogeneity of Theories, Experimentation, and Learning 
In modern approaches to the economic theory of federalism, information and 
knowledge problems play an important role. In the traditional economic 
theory of federalism it has been implicitly assumed that the policy-makers on 
the central level have perfect information about all relevant data for their 
policy decisions. If we assume that on the central level there is an 
“omniscient” (and benevolent) planner, then it is hard to argue for any form 
of decentralisation from an economic point of view, because this planner 
knows the best solution for all. But in reality we have serious information and 
knowledge problems. The economic theory of federalism claims that the 
solution of these knowledge problems is a crucial criterion for the decision on 
the vertical allocation of competencies. Two k inds of information and 
knowledge problems can be differentiated. 
Local knowledge: If the relevant knowledge for solving problems does not 
exist on the central level, but only in lower-level jurisdictions, a powerful 
argument for decentralisation emerges, because tasks should be allocated to 
that jurisdictional level where the most relevant knowledge is available. This 
can be called the problem of local knowledge.31 This can be relevant (a) for 
                                                 
30   Public choice and rent-seeking arguments in regard to centralisation and 
decentralisation will also be discussed in sections III.B.5 and III.C. 
31   Theoretically it can be traced back to Hayek’s claim that the economically relevant 
knowledge in a society cannot be entirely centralised, leading to his argument of the 
impossibility of central planning and the superiority of the market economy, which 
can use the dispersed knowledge in a society; see Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
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the competition rules themselves, because the different circumstances in the 
jurisdictions might mean that different substantive competition rules are 
appropriate, and (b) for the application of competition rules. The 
decentralisation of the application of a higher-level competition law can be 
defended by the argument that lower-level enforcement agencies can have 
superior local knowledge than those on higher levels.  
Uncertainty about the best theories and legal rules: More important than the 
problem of local knowledge is that we cannot assume that the best rules for 
protecting competition have already been found. It would be a “pretence of 
knowledge” (Hayek), if we (as legal and economic scholars) were to think 
that we already know the best legal rules for competition law, and that no 
improvements are possible. Our limited knowledge about the best set of 
competition rules is reflected in the existence of different theories of 
competition, of different recommendations as to what kind of competition 
rules should be used to protect competition, and in the controversial 
discussions on what set of criteria should be applied for the diagnosis of 
anticompetitive behaviour or dominant positions. In that respect, we can 
explain the simultaneous existence of different competition rules in different 
countries also by a variety of theories about competition which are applied in 
these countries.32 
Since we cannot be sure that we already know the best legal rules for 
protecting competition, it has to be seen as a permanent task to improve and 
adapt the rules and criteria for the assessment of business behaviour or market 
structures. This can be supported by two arguments: (a) Just as we have 
technical progress in regard to products and production processes (product 
and process innovations), we can also have innovations in regard to legal 
rules for the protection of competition, which might improve how we fight 
restraints of competition. (b) Since firms can create new forms of 
anticompetitive business behaviours or new technical innovations can lead to 
new kinds of markets, new challenges for the protection of competition can 
emerge, which require an evolution of competition laws  – or at least an 
evolution of the substantive criteria in the application of competition laws. 
In the modern economic theory of federalism, decentralisation is seen as an 
important solution for tackling problems with this knowledge and ensuring a 
high degree of innovativeness and adaptability. The fundamental argument is 
                                                                                                               
Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945). Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 
131, use the argument of information asymmetries. 
32   Whereas in the U.S. an efficiency approach on the theoretical basis of Chicago 
economics prevails, other competition policies can use different theories of 
competition leading to different criteria for the assessment of potential restraints of 
competition. 
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that in multi-level systems of jurisdictions with decentralised competencies, 
the lower-level jurisdictions can experiment with different solutions for 
public goods and policies. This diversity leads to different experiences and to 
the identification of the relatively best policy solution, which can be learned 
by other jurisdictions. One of the most prominent experts in the economic 
theory of federalism, Oates, characterizes a federal system as a “laboratory” 
in which policy innovations are generated and spread.33 This can be compared 
both to the Schumpeterian notion of the innovation and imitation of new 
products and production processes in markets and to  Hayek’s concept of 
“competition as a discovery procedure,” in which parallel processes of 
experimentation take place, leading to the identification of superior 
knowledge and to the spreading of this k nowledge by imitation.34 In legal 
contributions to the problem of “uniformity of law” versus “diversity of law” 
the advantages of decentralised experimentation processes for the evolution 
of legal rules have been emphasized as well. 35 
Thus, in the long run, decentralisation in competition policy might help to 
improve competition rules by enabling jurisdictions to learn from each other’s 
experiences. This also entails a greater capability to correct errors that might 
have emerged in the evolution of competition law regimes. This advantage of 
                                                 
33   See  Oates, supra n. 17, 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1120, 1133 (1999). 
Whereas in a centralised system of competition law, only sequential experimentation 
with different rules and criteria are possible, a decentralised system of competiton 
laws allows for parallel processes of experimentation. The latter will lead to more 
experience and therefore to a more rapid process of learning about the best 
competition rules. In this respect, it would be an interesting research project to analyse 
the mutual learning processes between different systems of competition law, both 
horizontally, as between U.S. antitrust law and German competition law, and 
vertically, as between German competition law and European competition law. For 
such learning processes see also Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 138 et 
seq. and Budzinski, supra n. 2. 
34   See Hayek, Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, 1968. 
35   See e.g.,  Behrens, Vorausetzungen und Grenzen der Rechtsfortbildung durch 
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 50 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht (1986) 19;  Kirchner, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Treaty on 
European Union: A Critique from the Perspective of Constitutional Economics, 6 
Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. 291 (1998); Trebilcock & Howse, supra n. 10; Van den 
Bergh, Subsidiarity as an Economic Demarcation Principle and the Emergence of 
European Private Law, 5 Maastricht J. Europ. & Comp. L. 129 (1998);  Van den 
Bergh, supra n. 19;  Van den Bergh, supra n. 20. For a general analysis of the 
advantages of legal diversity from the perspective of innovation economics, see 
Kerber, Rechtseinheitlichkeit und Rechtsvielfalt aus ökonomischer Sicht, in: 
Grundmann (ed.), Systembildung und Systemlücken in Kerngebieten des 
Europäischen Privatrechts, 2000, p. 67. 
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a decentralised international system of competition laws has already been 
emphasized by a number of scholars in the discussion on international 
competition policy.36 
5.  Other Criteria 
Beyond the criteria already mentioned, there are a number of additional 
criteria that can be used from the perspective of the economic theory of 
federalism for the vertical allocation of competencies in a multi-level system 
of competition law regimes. One of these criteria is the consistency of a legal 
system. In a decentralised system of competition law regimes there might be 
problems of compatibility between legal rules from different jurisdictional 
levels. In a centralised competition law regime, problems of lacking 
compatibility of legal rules, and thus inconsistencies, are less probable than in 
decentralised systems. A particularly important issue in the economic theory 
of federalism is whether centralisation or decentralisation leads to a larger 
amount of wealth-reducing, rent-seeking activities. Usually it is argued that a 
greater decentralisation of the power of the state would help the citizens to 
monitor the activities of the state and therefore would reduce the negative 
effects of rent seeking. Since competition policies can also be influenced by 
special interest groups, the rent seeking problem can also be an issue for 
competition law, both on the level of legislation and the level of application 
to specific competition cases. Although there are well-established arguments 
for the position that a decentralised approach to competition policy might 
reduce rent seeking, other arguments that speak in favour of centralisation 
have also to be considered. 
6.  Regulatory Competition in Competition Law: 
A Special Problem 
All of the above-mentioned criteria can be used to decide on the optimal 
degree of centralisation and decentralisation of competition policy in a multi-
level system of competition laws. But within a federal system, in which 
decentralisation exists to a certain degree, the additional question arises 
whether decentralisation is accompanied by processes of competition between 
                                                 
36   See, e.g., Meessen, Competition of Competition Laws, 10 Northwestern J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 17 (1989); Kerber, supra n. 1; Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 138 et 
seq.; Budzinski , supra n. 2; Grimes, supra n. 5; First, supra n. 2 in respect to the 
decentrality of antitrust networks. 
28 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2003,  Paper 13
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2003/iss1/art13An International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws: Federalism in Antitrust 
  29
the legal rules of the lower-level jurisdictions. Are there processes of 
regulatory competition in our envisaged multi-level system of competition 
laws? Does competition  among competition laws exist? Would regulatory 
competition in regard to competition laws lead to negative “race to the 
bottom” effects or – on the contrary – to a “race to the top”? And: what are 
the preconditions for a workable regulatory competition among competition 
laws?37 Regulatory competition is a complex issue. In this article it is not 
possible to analyse this problem thoroughly. But some preliminary 
considerations are presented. 
The general discussion about regulatory competition has shown that neither 
of the two extreme positions, one of which generally condemns regulatory 
competition due to problems of “race to the bottom” and other arguments of 
market failure, and the other argues that the positive effects of regulatory 
competition always prevail, stands up to a critical assessment. Whether the 
advantages or problems of regulatory competition predominate, depend both 
on the specific regulations and on the institutional framework for regulatory 
competition. Whereas regulatory competition might work satisfactorily in 
regard to the corporate laws of the federal states within the specific 
institutional context of the U.S., competition among corporate laws might 
have different effects within the present institutional setting of the European 
Union. In the same way, regulatory competition in competition law might 
work very differently from regulatory competition in consumer law or labour 
law. Consequently, processes of competition among competition laws have to 
be analysed very carefully. 
The crucial problem is that there often is no clear concept of the meaning of 
regulatory competition: what do we mean by competition among competition 
laws? From a theoretical perspective we have to distinguish at least three 
different types of regulatory competition:38 
(I)  Yardstick competition: If only information can cross the borders of 
jurisdictions, then yardstick competition is the sole type of regulatory 
competition that is possible. For example, citizens in Germany might observe 
that the U.S. antitrust policy leads to a better protection of competition than 
the German competition policy, urging the German government to imitate the 
U.S. competition rules. Thus yardstick competition allows for reaping the 
advantages of mutual learning through the observation of experimentation 
processes in different jurisdictions. 
(II)  Indirect regulatory competition through international trade: If, in 
addition to that, firms of different countries compete with their goods and 
                                                 
37   See e.g. Meessen, supra n. 36; Petersmann, supra n. 1, New England L. Rev. 145, 
155-157 (1999); Fox, supra n. 4; Guzman, supra n. 4. 
38   See Kerber & Heine, supra n. 3. 
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services on international markets (mobility of goods and services), an indirect 
form of competition among the regulations of different countries can emerge. 
Jurisdictions with superior regulations, such as e.g. more efficient 
competition laws, might have a cost advantage in comparison to their foreign 
competitors. 
(III)  Regulatory competition as part of interjurisdictional competition: If 
firms and production factors are mobile between the jurisdictions, 
competition among jurisdictions for mobile resources emerges. In that case, 
the jurisdictions try to attract investments and firms by offering attractive 
regulations as part of the entire bundle of public goods, legal rules and taxes 
in this jurisdiction. Since particular laws like competition laws represent only 
a small fraction of the entire bundle the jurisdictions offer, regulatory 
competition in regard to one particular law (like the competition law) might 
be rather limited. 
(IV) Regulatory competition in the case of free choice of law: Competition 
among regulations can be much stronger if the firms have the right to choose 
between regulations of different jurisdictions without having to change their 
location. For example, competition among corporate laws within the U.S. is 
characterised by the right of the firms to choose freely between the corporate 
laws of the states irrespective of the location of their business activities in the 
U.S. In the case of competition law this would imply that the firms can 
choose, e.g. in a merger case, between different competition laws. 
It is clear that these are very different types of regulatory competition. We 
will not analyse here the possibilities and the advantages and disadvantages of 
these types of regulatory competition in regard to competition laws. But it is 
necessary to emphasize that the rules for the horizontal and vertical 
delimitation of competencies within a multi-level structure of competition law 
regimes are decisive for the question of which type of regulatory competition 
is possible in regard to competition laws. For example, if all countries apply 
the “effects d octrine” consistently, it is unclear to what extent regulatory 
competition of type (III) and (IV) is possible, because the firms can choose 
neither directly, by choice of law, nor indirectly, by moving their location to 
another jurisdiction, the competition law under which they do their business. 
On the contrary, the “effects doctrine” leads to the problem that e.g. a merger 
case is reviewed simultaneously by several competition law regimes, 
implying an accumulation of requirements for the clearing of one merger.39 
But the situation might become different if – through bilateral or multilateral 
agreements about negative or positive comity or the introduction of the model 
of lead jurisdictions for merger cases – the “effects doctrine” is restricted. 
                                                 
39   In the case of an ineffective extra-territorial application of domestic competition laws, 
some kind of regulatory competition of type (III) might be possible. 
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Then it will be necessary to analyse carefully whether processes of regulatory 
competition can emerge, and how it can be ensured that these forms of 
competition among competition law regimes have more positive than 
negative effects.40 
C.  Centralisation or Decentralisation of the Enforcement 
of Competition Laws 
In section II.A we argued that competition law regimes consist of the 
substantive rules for protecting competition on one hand and of the 
enforcement agencies (competition authorities, courts) on the other hand. In 
the last section some criteria for the centralisation and decentralisation of 
substantive competition rules have been discussed. In the same way, we can 
also ask whether the enforcement of competition laws should be carried out 
by a centralised competition authority or by a system of decentralised 
competition authorities. Additionally, we can ask whether the enforcement 
should be based exclusively on the state through tax-funded competition 
authorities (as is common in Europe), or whether the activities  of the 
competition authorities should also be accompanied by private litigation (as is 
the case in U.S. antitrust law). The private enforcement of competition laws 
by suing firms that violate competition laws for damages in civil courts can 
be understood as an additional form of decentralisation of the enforcement of 
competition laws. The example of the U.S. system of enforcement of antitrust 
laws makes it clear that very complex systems with a multitude of public and 
private enforcers on different jurisdictional levels are possible. 41  
Since the quality of the enforcement of legal rules is crucial, the question of 
the optimal degree of centralisation or decentralisation of the competition law 
enforcement system is as important as for the substantial rules. T his is 
particularly true for a possible international level of competition law regime, 
because here decentralised enforcement agencies will have to play a 
                                                 
40   One important problem is “forum shopping”, which, for example, is possible in regard 
to merger control in Europe, because merging firms can influence through the specific 
design of a merger whether it exceeds the turnover thresholds for EU merger control 
or remains within the competence of national merger control. For other examples see 
also Van den Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 151 et seq. 
41   The example of the EU shows that the problem of centralisation and decentralisation 
can be seen differently in regard to substantive competition rules and the enforcement 
of these rules. Whereas a clear tendency towards the harmonisation and centralisation 
of substantive competition rules can be observed, a decentralising approach is pursued 
in regard to the enforcement of the European competition rules. 
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prominent role. Generally, it is also possible to use a similar set of criteria as 
in section III.B for assessing whether substantial competition rules should be 
enforced in a more centralised or decentralised way: For example, economies 
of scale arguments might speak for a centralised competition authority instead 
of several different ones with the multiplication of fixed costs. The criterion 
of the extent of local knowledge, however, can be a powerful argument for a 
more decentralised approach. The same is true for the capacity of the 
competition law regime for innovation, experimentation and learning. A  
decentralised system of enforcement agencies can be superior in developing 
new arguments and introducing them into the economic and legal discussion 
about the appropriate way to fight restraints of competition. Another 
argument is that a decentralised enforcement system with a multitude of 
enforcement agencies  – as in the U.S.  – might provide better protection 
against the capture of enforcement agencies by rent-seeking interests. 
However, such a decentralised system can bring with it high enforcement and 
transaction costs, particularly through parallel and long-lasting legal 
proceedings.42  
IV.  International Competition Policy as a Multi-
Level System of Competition Laws: 
Some Conclusions  
There is wide-spread agreement among governments as well as among 
experts on competition policy that some kind of international arrangement is 
necessary for better protection of competition on international markets. The 
current quasi-anarchistic situation of the parallel existence of many different 
national competition law regimes (including the “effects doctrine”) does not 
fulfil the requirements for a workable system of protection of competition on 
international markets. One long-term perspective is to strive for the 
convergence of national competition laws with the implicit ultimate end of 
replacing the national one-level competition law regimes with a global one-
level competition law regime with uniform substantive competition rules, a 
global competition authority and a corresponding court. In this article we hold 
the opinion that this perspective is not only unrealistic but also not the 
theoretically optimal solution. Instead, it is claimed that a global system for 
the protection of competition should be characterised by a considerable 
                                                 
42   See for arguments concerning these problems e.g.  Posner, Antitrust in the New 
Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925 (2001); First, supra n. 5; Grimes, supra n. 5; Van den 
Bergh & Camesasca, supra n. 3, p. 140 et seq. 
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degree of decentralisation. Therefore, the perspective of an international 
multi-level system of competition law regimes is developed. 
The application of the economic theories of federalism and regulatory 
competition shows that there are many advantages for a decentralised 
approach to competition policy. The most important advantages are that a 
decentralised system is much more flexible and innovative in reacting to new 
kinds of restraints of competition, because experimentation with new 
competition rules are possible, from whose success or failure other 
competition law regimes can learn, and that also the different preferences can 
be met in a better way. But these theories can also show the disadvantages of 
decentralisation in terms of increasing conflicts and transaction costs, etc. The 
contention is that an integrated multi-level system of competition law regimes 
that combines the advantages of centralisation and the advantages of 
decentralisation might be the optimal institutional solution. The basic idea of 
federalism has always been that t he skilful combination of elements of 
centralisation and elements of decentralisation can lead to superior solutions. 
The concept of a multi-level system of competition laws and enforcement 
agencies allows for much flexibility in finding the optimal allocation of 
competencies to the different jurisdictional levels. 
It was not the task of this article to elaborate in detail how an international 
multi-level system of competition law regimes might look, but to show that 
the economic theory of federalism can also be applied to antitrust. This 
analysis has still to be done thoroughly. But it can be presumed that an 
international system of competition law regimes will be a two- or (as within 
the EU) three-level system. In section II it was shown that the current 
structure is not far away from the notion of a three-level system. It can also be 
suggested that this system will be primarily based on the national competition 
law regimes (within the EU: European competition law). Crucial for the 
workability of an international multi-level system of competition laws is an 
integrated set of procedural rules (or institutional framework) which 
determines the competencies of competition laws and enforcement agencies 
(competition authorities, courts, private parties). This especially includes the 
horizontal and vertical delimitation of competencies. 
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